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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent valuation is a complex, occasionally confusing concept that has
become somewhat of a gray area in intellectual property. Patent value is “the
economic benefit that the patent can bestow upon its owner.”1 It involves
determining a patent’s monetary value to the patent’s owner, which can prove
difficult based on the fact that patents are inherently unique.2 Generally, the
more significance a patent has to society, the higher its value.3 There are
currently seven different valuation methods used for valuing intellectual
property.4 They include the following: the twenty-five (25) Percent Rule,
Industry Standards, Ranking, Surrogate Measures, Disaggregation Methods,
the Monte Carlo Method, and Option Methods.5 While these are all widely
used methods, none of them are definitive, and they are continually being
updated.6 In fact, the Federal Circuit recently held that the twenty-five (25)
Percent Rule is flawed, and it would no longer be accepting evidence using that
method.7

1. Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios Through
Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 465 (2007).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 466.
4. Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets: An Overview, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1133, 1134 (2002).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1139–40.
7. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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On the opposite end of this valuation spectrum is determining when a patent
has no value and has become worthless or obsolete.8 Patents are generally
granted for a seventeen-year period, and throughout the life of a patent, the
patent holder can take tax deductions for things such as amortization or normal
wear and tear.9 Tax deductions can also be taken for patent obsolescence or
“worthlessness.”10 If the patent becomes worthless before its expiration year,
the unrecovered cost may be deducted in that year.11 However, there have not
been many case discussions on what determines when a patent is “worthless”
or when exactly a patent has become obsolete for purpose of these tax
deductions. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, obsolescence is
“the process of becoming obsolete or the condition of being nearly obsolete
. . . .”12 While this definition is easy enough for most to understand, albeit
somewhat obvious, it does nothing to further the question of when a patent has
reached that point. Much of the same can be said for the case law surrounding
the topic, which is the crux of the problem.
The most recent cases discussing patent obsolescence can be sourced back
to the 1920s and 1930s with Tennessee Fibre Co. v. C.I.R. and Hazeltine Corp.
v. C.I.R. These cases came about during the height of the “paper patent”
doctrine, which differentiated patents based on whether or not they had ever
been put to use.13 The outcomes of these cases reflected the times. Both the
Tennessee Fibre Co. and Hazeltine decisions rested on the actual use of the
patent in determining its value.14
This comment considers a key question: what is the correct method for
determining patent worthlessness or obsolescence? Is it the method used
almost a century ago? Part II of this comment will delve into the paper patent
doctrine and its effect on the question. Part III will further look at how this
paper patent approach has been applied toward evaluating patents. In contrast,
Part IV will look into the approach that has more recently been applied. This
newer method involves a two-prong test of subjective and objective factors.15
Finally, in Part V, this Comment will conclude by assessing what is the correct
8. It should be noted, throughout this comment these terms may be used interchangeably, seeing
that much of the case law uses “worthlessness” when talking about obsolescence.
9. Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation, 22C:31 Depreciation of Patents, Westlaw.
10. Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)–9.
11. Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)–6(a).
12. Obsolescence,
Merriam-Webster.com,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/obsolescence.
13. John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1360
(2013).
14. Tenn. Fibre Co. v. C.I.R., 15 B.T.A. 133, 140 (B.T.A. 1929); Hazeltine Corp. v. C.I.R., 89
F.2d 513, 521–22 (3d Cir. 1937).
15. Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. C.I.R., T.C. Summ.Op. 2003-19, *6 (2003).
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approach that should be used when discussing patent worthlessness. Because
of the definitiveness of the newer test, it should be the chosen method for
determining when a patent becomes worthless.
II. THE “PAPER PATENT” ERA
Until the 1950s, the “paper patent” doctrine was an integral part of
intellectual property.16 As previously mentioned, this doctrine correlated to
patent use.17 Courts distinguished patents on whether or not the patent was
actually used.18 Those that were not used were referred to as “paper patents,”
and courts were more inclined to hold them invalid.19 Though its importance
remained somewhat relevant until the early 1980s, it completely died with the
creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.20 There was no definitive explanation
given for the shift, but an important question had arisen during the doctrine’s
heyday, which looked at why a patent’s nonuse was considered an unfavorable
factor.21 The problem this posed is what eventually led to all patents being
held in equal light regardless of their use.22
Though there was no explicit explanation given for the end of the paper
patent era, one source of its demise was the emergence and domination of the
“documentary disclosure” theory.23 This theory stands for the fact that the only
statutory disclosure required for patents is set forth in the patent document.24 It
is “the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.”25 Therefore, it is a paper disclosure
set by a minimal standard.26 Because the only requirement for patents is this
paper disclosure, there is to be no discrimination against paper patents.27
Furthermore, today’s modern patent lawyers believe inventions can come
about by two ways: through “actual reduction to practice” or “constructive
reduction to practice.”28 An actual reduction to practice means the patent
application can actually work in the real world.29 A constructive reduction to
16. See Duffy, supra note 13, at 1360.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1388.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1361.
24. Id.
25. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)) (emphasis added).
26. Duffy, supra note 13, at 1362.
27. Id. at 1364.
28. Id. at 1366.
29. Id.
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practice means the invention of the patent itself need not have actually been
tested prior to being patented.30 The only requirement is that it could work if it
were actually built.31 This latter theory is somewhat in conflict with the paper
patent doctrine, and its acceptance by modern patent lawyers helps clarify why
the paper patent doctrine is no longer in use.
The influence of the paper patent doctrine in the first half of the twentieth
century was widespread in intellectual property. This explains why much of
the litigation of patents occurred during this time, and it also explains why the
holdings in those cases turned out the way they did. This comment will now
look at these cases in more depth to see the repercussions this standard had.
III. THE PAPER PATENT ERA’S INFLUENCE ON PATENT WORTHLESSNESS
The first such case involving the paper patent’s influence on patent
worthlessness was Tennessee Fibre Co. v. C.I.R. In this case, the petitioner
held a patent for a process that separated the cotton fiber from its seeds, with
the byproduct being bleached.32 This process and its resultant product became
very useful for gun cotton, and it was sold exclusively to munitions
manufacturers throughout the early 1910s.33 However, the petitioner’s success
changed after the end of World War I in 1918.34 With no more weapons needed
to supply a war, there was no longer any demand for the product, and the
petitioner determined the patent to be valueless.35 On his income taxes for
1918, he claimed a deduction for obsolescence, which was disallowed by the
Service.36
The petitioner argued that under IRC section 234(a), now IRC section
16737, he could take an obsolescence deduction.38 On review, the Board of Tax
Appeals agreed with the petitioner that there was no longer any use for the
patent because the market it served was completely wiped out,39
notwithstanding the fact that unbeknownst to everyone involved in the case
World War II would open that market back up in a few years. The court did,

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Tenn. Fibre Co. v. C.I.R., 15 B.T.A. 133, 134 (B.T.A. 1929).
33. Id. at 135.
34. Id. at 138.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Major tax code updates, notably in 1954 and 1986, changed code sections. Substantive
changes were made, but sometimes, as the case here, there were only changes with reference to the
specific code number.
38. Id. at 138–39.
39. Id. at 140.
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however, rule against the petitioner because he had not abandoned the patent.40
He continually put money into it, trying to find a use for it, and the court focused
on this in determining the patent was not completely obsolete.41 This focus on
the patent’s use was the tipping point in the court’s analysis.42
The next case to come about in the paper patent era was the aforementioned
Hazeltine case, which involved a patent for the composition of radio receivers.43
The petitioner, in determining that the patents became obsolete as a result of
new technology, took a large depreciation deduction on his company’s income
tax return for the year.44 The Commissioner originally disallowed the
depreciation taken, reasoning that the depreciation should have been amortized
over a longer period of time because the life of the patent was not over.45
However, upon review, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the
petitioner, holding that patent obsolescence related to use.46 The patents here
were obsolete because “they had gone completely out of use and no longer had
any practical commercial value.”47 In reaching this conclusion, the court made
a distinction between obsolescence and complete obsoleteness:
It is of course true that the Neutrodyne circuit continued capable after
1930, of performing, for those who still desired to use it, the same
function in radio reception which it had theretofore performed, and it
may well be that a few persons did continue to use it after that time.
This, however, is far from saying that it was not obsolescent so far as
practical commercial use or public acceptance was concerned, since, as
we have seen, all the evidence bearing on the question indicates that it
was substantially out of all commercial use by the end of that year.48
The issue with both Tennessee Fibre Co. and Hazeltine is that they employ
an arbitrary use standard influenced by the paper patent era. Critics of the
“paper patent49 Both cases support the critics. As previously mentioned, World
War II would open the market back up for gun ammunitions in a few years, but
the court in Tennessee Fibre Co. decided that because there was no use for the
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Hazeltine Corp. v. C.I.R., 89 F.2d 513, 515 (3d Cir. 1937).
44. Id. at 517.
45. Id. at 521.
46. Id. at 521–22.
47. Id. at 521.
48. Id. at 522.
49. Duffy, supra note 13, at 1360–61 (quoting Frank B. Killian & Co. v. Allied Latex Corp.,
188 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir. 1951).
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patent at that particular moment in time, the petitioner could have called his
patent worthless had he not still been trying to find a use for it.50 What would
have happened, then, to his patent at the start of World War II? Could the
petitioner have attempted to use it again? While there was not follow-up to this
case discussing the petitioner’s luck with the patent during the second world
war, there may be an issue with a taxpayer using a patent that he already
claimed on his tax returns to be worthless.
This scenario would certainly call into question the application of the tax
benefit rule. This concept requires a taxpayer to include in his gross income
the amount that was previously deducted if “the later event is indeed
fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction was
initially based.”51 Its premise relies on maintaining balance.52 It remedies the
situation “when an apparently proper expense turns out to be improper.”53 The
tax benefit rule applies to a variety of tax situations, including those regarding
corporate dividends, ordinary and necessary business expenses, and the amount
of damages correctly included in a taxpayer’s gross income. 54
Though the taxpayer may simply have to later include this amount in his
federal income taxes, there is another issue posed on how many times the
taxpayer could do this. For instance, a taxpayer may find it beneficial to
structure his tax returns by taking the obsolescence deductions in years where
he has greater income and then later paying the deducted amount on his income
tax return the next year when it would not cause as big of a financial hit. This
potential abuse of the tax code points out the problems with the court’s decision
to call the patent worthless for tax purposes based on pure speculation. There
was no way the court could have known World War II would break out shortly
thereafter, and perhaps another test employed would still reach the same
conclusion that court came to, but the nature of the court’s “use” test leaves it
with more opportunity to get the outcome wrong and cause confusion later on.
These same issues can be seen with the Hazeltine case. The court also held
in that case that new technology made the patent worthless and capable of the
obsolescence deduction, but there was not enough of a discussion on why that
was so, with the only reason given being that newer technology had been
developed that was presumptively better than the petitioner’s.55 In the 21st
century, technology is constantly evolving. If newer technology means that all
50. Tenn. Fibre Co. v. C.I.R., 15 B.T.A. 133, 140 (B.T.A. 1929).
51. Hillsboro Nat. Bank v. C.I.R., 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983).
52. Id. at 389 n.24.
53. Id. at 389 n.24.
54. Id. at 392; Byrd v. C.I.R., 1987 WL 38627, at *1 (1987); Citigroup, Inc. v. United States,
140 Fed. Cl. 283, 284–85 (2018).
55. Hazeltine Corp. v. C.I.R., 89 F.2d 513, 521 (3d Cir. 1937).

SUMER_FINAL_MACROED (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

8/11/20 12:26 PM

PATENT WORTHLESSNESS FOR TAX PURPOSES

99

previous technological advancements are rendered obsolete, then the Service is
going to see an influx of these worthlessness deductions being claimed. A
purely subjective determination on use will, again, result in potential issues
arising later on. While it is possible that the same conclusion and issues may
arise with another test, that overlap should still be less likely. It is also
important to consider whether this test is simply a way for taxpayers to make
money quickly by way of tax breaks rather than based on actual need.
Issues with these two cases were indirectly discussed in Western States
Machine Co. v. S.S. Hepworth Co., one of the first cases that marked the end of
the paper patent era.56 This was a patent infringement case involving sugar
centrifuges, with the plaintiff alleging that the defendant infringed on his earlier
ideas.57 There had been a twenty-one year gap between the patents, and despite
the first patent’s nonuse and making “no impression on the art,” the court held
that irrelevant.58 Judge Learned Hand, a strong critic of the paper patent
doctrine, expressed his belief that an unused patent should in no way negatively
impact the way the case was decided:
A patent may have lain for years unheeded, as little contribution to the
sum of knowledge as though it had never existed, an idle gesture long
since drifted into oblivion. Nevertheless, it will be as effective to
invalidate a new patent, as though it had entered into the very life blood
of the industry.59
The opinion further called the term “paper patent” merely rhetoric, and held
for the plaintiff.60 As seen in the case, the use standard was not a good enough
test for a patent infringement case, so it is difficult to conceive why it should
be good enough for determining patent worthlessness. The criticism of the
paper patent doctrine and the rejection of the nonuse standard in this case
played a big part in its decline.61
IV. THE NEWER TAX APPROACH
The shortcomings of the paper patent doctrine’s use standard has left an
opening for a different standard to be explored. As readily seen, the cases
discussed in this section occurred after the end of the paper patent doctrine in
the 1980s, so they were of the time when there was still not an adequate
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Duffy, supra note 13, at 1383.
W. States Mach. Co. v. S.S. Hepworth Co., 147 F.2d 345, 346 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id.
Duffy, supra note 13, at 1383.
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standard. The newer tax approach that has been employed leaves much less
room for guesswork resulting from the arbitrary, subjective tests previously
employed by the courts. The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and the Treasury
Regulations are clear that a taxpayer can take tax deductions for obsolescence.62
IRC § 167 codifies this right by stating “exhaustion, wear and tear, and
obsolescence are to be allowed…”63 Its accompanying treasury regulation
covers what obsolescence means in further detail:
The depreciation allowance includes an allowance for normal
obsolescence which should be taken into account to the extent that the
expected useful life of property will be shortened by reason thereof.
Obsolescence may render an asset economically useless to the taxpayer
regardless of its physical condition. Obsolescence is attributable to
many causes, including technological improvements and reasonably
foreseeable economic changes. Among these causes are normal
progress of the arts and sciences, supersession or inadequacy brought
about by developments in the industry, products, methods, markets,
sources of supply, and other like changes, and legislative or regulatory
action. In any case in which the taxpayer shows that the estimated
useful life previously used should be shortened by reason of
obsolescence greater than had been assumed in computing such
estimated useful life, a change to a new and shorter estimated useful life
computed in accordance with such showing will be permitted. No such
change will be permitted merely because in the unsupported opinion of
the taxpayer the property may become obsolete.64
There have not been any cases specifically involving patents that have used
this regulation’s guidance. That particular application has, unfortunately, not
yet come up. However, there have been cases involving intangible assets.65
These cases have expanded on what a showing of worthlessness requires.
One of the first of the case discussions occurred in Echols v. C.I.R. The
intangible assets involved were interests in a partnership that the taxpayers
claimed became worthless.66 It is here that the court developed the test for

62. I.R.C. 167(c); Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)–9; Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)–6(a).
63. I.R.C. 167(c).
64. Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)–9.
65. Echols v. C.I.R., 935 F.2d 703, 704–05 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying obsolescence to
partnership interests); Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. C.I.R., T.C. Summ. Op. 2003–19, *4 (2003)
(applying obsolescence to covenants not to compete); In re Steffen, 305 B.R. 369, 373 (Bkrtcy. M.D.
Fla. 2004) (applying obsolescence to stocks).
66. Echols, 935 F.2d at 704.

SUMER_FINAL_MACROED (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

8/11/20 12:26 PM

PATENT WORTHLESSNESS FOR TAX PURPOSES

101

determining worthlessness.67 The court noted that it is clear that property
cannot be treated as worthless if it has substantial value, but the issue of when
the property loses its value for tax purposes “is, like beauty, largely in the
eyes…of the beholder.”68 To solve that, the court implemented a test that
involved a subjective determination on the part of the taxpayer coupled with an
objective event.69 The court was careful to espouse the different standards for
determining abandonment of an intangible asset and the worthlessness of that
asset, thus indicating the two are separate concepts.70 Making the standard
clear, the court applied the test to the intangible assets:
Emphasizing again that the asset being tested for worthlessness is not
the Land but the Taxpayers’ 75% interest in the Partnership which
owned the Land, we must determine subjectively just when it was that
the Taxpayers deemed their Partnership interest worthless, then
determine objectively whether that interest was valueless at such time.71
After applying the test, the court held for the taxpayer.72 Shortly after this
decision, the Fifth Circuit defended the validity of its test when asked by the
Commissioner to reconsider its treatment of worthlessness.73 The Court
reiterated the test and further stated the objective part should be an “identifiable
event” or completed transaction.74 The Court left the latter requirement broad,
indicating that it does not have to be a property transaction or even include the
asset in question.75
This test was further honed in Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. C.I.R. The
intangible assets involved were covenants not to compete in logging contracts
entered into by the petitioner.76 After a logging injunction was issued in
Arizona to protect an endangered species, the petitioner deducted the value of
three covenants not to compete.77 To assess the validity of the deductions, the
Court, following Echols, stated the evaluation of worthlessness was a twopronged test.78 In the first prong, the Court is to determine whether the taxpayer
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 709.
Echols v. C.I.R., 950 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 211.
Id.
Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. C.I.R., T.C. Summ.Op. 2003–19, *1 (2003).
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *4.
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“made a subjective determination that the asset in question was worthless in the
tax year in question.”79 Here, the taxpayer satisfied the first prong by showing
that the logging industry in the area had collapsed, resulting in him reporting
unamortized amounts as a loss on his corporate tax returns.80 In the second
prong, the taxpayer must show an identifiable event “evidencing the destruction
of an asset’s value.”81 Like the regulations stated, if there was a reasonable
possibility that the asset will have a future value, the second prong of the test
fails.82 The identifiable event here was a statewide logging ban, thus making it
impossible for the covenantees to compete and ensuring that the asset could not
possibly have any future value.83
The identifiable event of the second prong takes more than a mere decline
in the asset’s value.84 It would take something such as formal bankruptcy or
market conditions to satisfy it.85 Until the “last vestige of value has
disappeared,” a worthlessness deduction cannot be taken.86 This test is also not
satisfied just because something, such as a partnership, is not properly
managed.87
It is clear that the case law in this area is plentiful and at the point where
the test has been adequately defined with enough variations to cover a wide
variety of situations. Though it has not been applied to any patents, it has been
applied to many intangible assets. Because patents are considered intangible
assets, there is no discernable reason why this area could not expand to include
patents.
V. WHICH STANDARD IS BEST FOR PATENTS?
The use standard of the paper patent era has already been hit with much
criticism, which contributed to its decline.88 This criticism stemmed from a
79. Id. at *5.
80. Id. at *6.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Forlizzo v. C.I.R., T.C. Memo 2018-137, *3 (2018) (holding that a taxpayer could not take
an obsolescence deduction for his interest in real estate development partnerships because of a failure
to show a closed and completed transaction).
85. Id.
86. In re Steffen, 305 B.R. 369, 375 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 2004).
87. Lebow v. C.I.R., T.C. Memo. 1995-333, *4–5 (1995) (holding that just because petitioner
could not secure any information or distributions from partnership did not mean that his interest in it
was worthless).
88. W. States Mach. Co. v. S.S. Hepworth Co.,147 F.2d 345, 350 (2d Cir. 1945); Frank B.
Killian & Co. v. Allied Latex Corp, 188 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that the paper patent
doctrine is merely “rhetoric” and a “meaningless platitude”); Siegel v. Watson, 267 F.2d 621, 624
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
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fundamental flaw with the doctrine that could not be squared. In his analysis
of the paper patent doctrine, John Duffy summed up its issues as follows:
Criticism from famous judges, especially Learned Hand, was clearly a
significant factor in the doctrine’s decline, but such prominent criticism
was only part of the story. The more general problem was that the
doctrine never had a rigorous theoretical justification. It was an
intuition…one that could not be grounded in the basic purposes of the
patent system as they were understood in the latter half of the twentieth
century. The absence of that theoretical justification led to the
decline.89
Duffy’s criticism is spot on. There is no actual justification for why there
should be an arbitrary use standard. As mentioned, modern patent lawyers
believe in the concept of “constructive reduction to practice.”90 A patent just
has to be capable of working, but the patentee need not have actually built in or
used it in the real world.91 These patents are every bit as good as those covered
by the concept of “actual reduction to practice,” i.e. those that are actually used
in the real world.92 Even the courts have fully embraced this concept.93 Since
the use standard of the paper patent era has been rejected, applying it to patent
worthlessness or obsolescence seems futile.
Compared to the use test that stems from the paper patent doctrine, the twoprong test that came about in Echols is much clearer. It takes into account not
only the petitioner’s subjective belief that a patent is obsolete but it also requires
an objective determination, guided by some event, that a court can use to make
an informed decision.94 A clear test will provide guidance and ensure there will
be equal treatment for all cases as opposed to varying conclusions courts could
reach when applying a different, broader standard. Additionally, this test makes
the tax code and treasury regulations less likely to be abused. As stated in the
follow-up opinion in Echols, a taxpayer cannot “arbitrarily deduct a loss in any
year he chooses.”95 There has to be some objective support for that
determination.96

89. Duffy, supra note 13, at 1383.
90. Id. at 1366.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Lisa A. Dolak, Patents Without Paper: Proving a Date of Invention with
Electronic Evidence, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 471, 491–92 (1999)).
93. Duffy, supra note 13, at 1371.
94. Echols v. C.I.R., 935 F.2d 703, 707 (5th Cir. 1991).
95. Echols v. C.I.R., 950 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1991).
96. Id.
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Had this test been around when the Hazeltine case was decided, it is likely
that the outcome would have been different. A court today could conclude that
the facts of that case did not satisfy the second prong because there was neither
an identifiable, objective event evidencing obsolescence nor, as the court in In
re Steffen put it, had the “last vestige of value” of the patent disappeared.97
VI. CONCLUSION
Though there have not been many worthlessness or obsolescence cases
regarding patents in the last eighty years or so, it is still important to look at this
area of case law because of the different reasoning the courts have used to reach
decisions. The cases on patent obsolescence from the paper patent era are still
considered good law, so a determination needs to be made if future patent
obsolescence cases should follow their logic. This comment’s assessment of
that era’s reasoning concludes future cases should not. The reasoning of those
cases was too broad and had no uniform justification on how decisions were
reached.
The approach that should be followed is the most recent test employed,
which is not a product of the paper patent era. It provides a clearer standard for
courts to use that will be subject to less abuse. By giving the taxpayer his
subjective say in the matter and checking that by an objective event the court
can look to, it provides the fairest result. Additionally, there is less of a chance
for courts to reach an outcome that may have later tax complications.

97. In re Steffen, 305 B.R. 369, 375 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 2004).

